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We propose a new approach to model costly international trade, which
includes the standard approach, the “iceberg” transport cost, as a special case.
The key idea is to make the technologies of supplying the good depend on the
destination of the good.  To demonstrate our approach, we extend the Ricardian
model with a continuum of goods, due to Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson
(1977), by introducing multiple factors of production and by making each industry
consist of the domestic division, which supplies the good at home, and the export
division, which supplies the good abroad.  If the two divisions differ only in the
total factor productivity, our model becomes isomorphic to the DFS model with
the iceberg transport cost.  When the two divisions differ also in the factor
intensity, globalization changes the relative factor prices in the same direction
across the countries, in sharp contrast to the usual Stolper-Samuelson effect,
which suggests that the relative factor prices move in different directions in
different countries.
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1. Introduction.
In this paper, we propose a new approach to model costly international trade.  The key
idea is to make the technologies of supplying the goods depend on the destination of the goods.
By using the word, “supply,” we mean to include all the activities associated with delivering the
goods to the customers in a particular market.  It includes not only the production and the
shipping of the goods, but also the marketing and customer services, which involve
communication with the dealers, customers, and even government agencies.  If it is more costly
to supply goods to the foreign markets than the domestic market, this approach naturally
generates the home market bias, leading to deviations from the law of one price, as well as
endogenously determined nontraded goods (i.e., the goods that are potentially “tradeable” but not
traded in equilibrium.)
Our approach includes the standard approach to model costly trade, the “iceberg”
transport cost, as a special case.  According to the iceberg approach, commonly attributed to
Samuelson (1954), the technologies of producing the goods are the same, whether the destination
of the goods is at home or abroad.  The cost of trade takes the form of “shrinkage” in transit so
that only a fraction of the good shipped abroad actually arrives.  Our approach would generate
the same result with the iceberg approach if we would impose the additional restriction that the
technologies of supplying the goods differ across the destinations of the goods only in the total
factor productivity.  Our approach is more flexible than the iceberg approach in that it allows for
the possibility that supplying the goods abroad may use the factors in a different proportion from
supplying the goods at home.  This flexibility enables us to explore the effects of globalization
that cannot be captured by using the iceberg approach.
For example, imagine that the cost of supplying the goods abroad decline relative to the
cost of supplying domestically.  Such a change in the relative cost can happen for many different
reasons, such as technological advances in information technologies (telegraphs, telephones,
facsimiles, internet, communication satellites, etc), a tariff reduction, a harmonization of the
regulations across countries, a wider acceptance of English as the global business language, an
emergence of the global consumer culture that reduces the need to make the goods and services
tailor-made for each country, etc.  The resulting globalization means a reallocation of the factors
from supplying the goods at home to supplying the goods abroad.  If we are to model this process2
by reducing the iceberg transport cost, globalization can change relative factor demands only
through the standard Stolper-Samuelson effect.  That is to say, relative factor demands of a
country can change only when the country’s exported goods and its imported goods have
different factor intensity.  This also means that globalization tends to move the factor prices in
different directions in different countries.  If the wage rate of white-collar workers relative to
blue-collar workers goes up in one country, it has to go down in the rest of the world.  Our
approach suggests that this need not be the case.  If exporting goods inherently require more
intensive use of some factors (say, white-collar workers, particularly those with language skills
and/or international business experiences) than supplying the same goods domestically,
globalization leads to an increase in the relative price of those factors in all the countries.  Our
approach thus offers a fresh perspective on the debate on the role of globalization in the recent
rise in the skill premia.
Obviously, one could try to apply our approach to any existing model of international
trade with the iceberg transport cost.  In this paper, we have chosen the Ricardian model with a
continuum of goods, developed by Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977), hereafter DFS.
Their model offers a useful background against which to demonstrate our approach for the
following reasons.  First, its Ricardian structure enables us to illustrate the difference between
our approach and the iceberg approach without complication of the well-understood Stolper-
Samuelson effect.  Second, to the best of our knowledge, DFS is the first study that derived the
set of nontraded goods endogenously by making use of the iceberg transport cost.  Furthermore,
DFS has inspired many recent studies on competitive models of international trade with the
iceberg transport cost.
2
Section 2 develops our model, which extends the DFS model in two respects.  First, it has
multiple factors of production.  Second, each industry consists of two divisions; the domestic
division, which supplies the good at home, and the export division, which supplies the good
abroad.  The two divisions use different technologies, and it is assumed that it is more costly to
supply the good abroad than at home.  We use this model to examine the effect of an
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improvement in the export technologies on the trade patterns and the factor prices.
3  Section 3
considers the special case, where the technologies of the domestic and export divisions differ
only in the total factor productivity.  With this additional restriction, an improvement in the
export technologies leads to a globalization, but has no effect on the relative factor prices.
Indeed, it is demonstrated that this special case is isomorphic to the DFS model with the iceberg
transport cost.  Section 4 considers the general case, where the domestic and export divisions
may differ also in the factor intensity.  It shows how an improvement in the export technologies
leads to globalization as well as a change in the relative factor prices.  Section 5 considers an
application to the debate on the role of globalization in the recent rise in the skill premia.  Under
the assumption that the export division is more skilled labor intensive than the domestic division,
globalization leads to a rise in the skill premia in all the countries, if the globalization is caused
by a reduction in the tariff, or by the technical change that primarily in the export divisions or by
skill labor augmenting technical change.  Section 6 concludes.
2. The Basic Model.
Consider the following variation of the DFS model.  The world economy consists of two
countries, Home and Foreign, and there are a continuum of competitive industries, indexed by z є
[0,1], which produces good z.  The Home consumers have the identical Cobb-Douglas
preferences with b(z) being the expenditure share of good z, with 
1
0
b(z)dz = 1.  Thus, the Home
demand for good z is given by D(z) = b(z)E/p(z), where p(z) is the Home price of good z and E is
the Home aggregate expenditure.  Likewise, the Foreign demand for good z is D*(z) =
b*(z)E*/p*(z), where b*(z) is the Foreign expenditure share of good z with 
1
0
b*(z)dz = 1, p*(z)
is the Foreign price of good z, and E* is the Foreign aggregate expenditure.
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This paper departs crucially from DFS in two respects.  First, there are J factors of
production, with V = (V1, V2, …, VJ)
T and V* = (V1*, V2*, … , VJ*)
T  being the column vectors
of the Home and Foreign factor endowments, where Vj and Vj* are the Home and Foreign
endowments of the j-th factor (j = 1, 2, …, J).  The factors are nontradeable and the factor prices
are given by the row vectors, w = (w1, w2, … , wJ) and w* = (w1*, w2*, …, wJ*).  We may think
of these factors as different types of labor, with different skill levels, expertise, and specialties.
Second, the technologies may depend on the destination of goods.  More specifically, each
industry consists of the two divisions, the domestic and the export divisions. The domestic
division of industry z at Home can supply one unit of good z to the Home market at the cost of
a(z)Φ(w), while its export division can supply one unit of good z to the Foreign market at the
cost of a(z)Ψ(w;τ).  It should be noted that the word, “supply,” here means to include all the
activities needed to deliver the good to the consumers in a particular market.  It includes not only
the production cost, but also the marketing and shipping costs, and all sorts of communication
costs.  Both Φ and Ψ are assumed to be linear homogeneous, increasing, and concave in w.
Thus, they satisfy the standard properties of the unit cost functions associated with CRS
technologies.  Likewise, the unit cost of the domestic division of the Foreign industry z is
a*(z)Φ*(w*), while the unit cost of the export division of the Foreign industry z is a*(z)Ψ*(w*;
τ*).  Note the presence of the shift parameters, τ and τ*, in the cost functions of the export
divisions.  We will use them to examine the effect of the technical change in the export divisions.
Furthermore, we will assume the following assumptions.
(A1) A(z) ≡ a*(z)/a(z) is continuous and decreasing in z.
(A2) Φ(w) < Ψ(w;τ); Φ*(w*) < Ψ*(w*;τ*).
The first assumption, (A1), is borrowed directly from DFS.  It means that the industries are
indexed according to the patterns of comparative advantage; Home (Foreign) has comparative
advantage in lower (higher) indexed goods.  (A2) implies that supplying (i.e., producing,
marketing, shipping, etc.) goods to the export market is more costly than supplying (i.e.,
producing, marketing, shipping, etc.) goods to the domestic market.  This model may be viewed
as a hybrid of the Ricardian model of trade and the factor proportion models of trade.  Across the5
industries, the technologies differ only in the total factor productivity, but not in the factor
intensity. Within each industry, on the other hand, the domestic and export divisions may differ
not only in total factor productivity, but also in factor intensity.  It should be noted, however,
that, unlike the standard factor proportion models of trade, the factor intensity differences are
based on the destination of the goods, not on the goods themselves.  Our objective here is to
explore the effects of technical change that improves the efficiency of the export divisions
relative to that of the domestic divisions across all the industries.  We deliberately rule out the
factor intensity differences across the goods, in order to isolate our result from the well-known
Stolper-Samuelson mechanism.
The consumers everywhere purchase the goods from the lowest cost suppliers.  Hence,
the price of good z is equal to p(z) = min{a(z)Φ(w), a*(z)Ψ*(w*;τ*)} and p*(z) =
min{a(z)Ψ(w;τ), a*(z)Φ*(w*)}.  Assumptions (A1) and (A2) thus imply that, for any factor
prices, w and w*, there are two marginal industries, m < m*,
(1) A(m) = Ψ(w;τ)/Φ*(w*),
(2) A(m*)  =  Φ(w)/Ψ*(w*;τ*),
such that the Home industries supply to the Home and Foreign markets in z є [0,m); only the
Foreign industries supply to the Home and Foreign markets in z є (m*,1], and only the Home
industries supply to the Home market and only the Foreign industries supply to the Foreign
market in z є (m,m*).   In other words, Home exports and Foreign imports in z є [0,m) and Home
imports and Foreign exports in z є (m*,1].  There is no trade in z є (m,m*).  These goods are
endogenously nontraded goods; that is to say, they are tradeable goods that are not traded in
equilibrium.  The patterns of production and trade are illustrated in Figure 1.
From the standard result of the duality theory of production (see, e.g., Dixit and Norman
1980), each unit of good z produced and purchased in Home generates demand for Home factor j
equal to a(z)Φj(w) = p(z)Φj(w)/Φ(w), where subscript j signifies the partial derivative with
respect to wj.  Similarly, each unit of good z produced in Home and purchased in Foreign
generates demand for Home factor j equal to a(z)Ψj(w;τ) = p*(z)Ψj(w;τ)/Ψ(w;τ).  Thus, the
equilibrium condition for the market for Home factor j is given by6







[p*(z)D*(z)]dz,  (j = 1, 2,…J),
where the first (second) term of the RHS is the derived demand for Home factor j from supplying
goods to the domestic (export) market.  By using p(z)D(z) =b(z)E and p*(z)D*(z) = b*(z)E*, this
condition can be rewritten to




[b(s)]ds and B*(z) ≡
z
0
[b*(s)]ds are the Home and Foreign expenditure shares
of the goods in [0, z].  They are strictly increasing and satisfy B(0) = B*(0) = 0 and B(1) = B*(1)
= 1.  This condition can be further simplified as
(3) wjVj = αj(w)B(m*)wV + βj(w;τ)B*(m)w*V* (j = 1, 2,…J)
by defining αj(w) ≡ wjΦj(w)/Φ(w) and βj(w;τ) ≡ wjΨj(w;τ)/Ψ(w;τ), and making use of the budget
constraints in the two countries, E = wV and E* = w*V*.  Eq. (3) can be easily interpreted.
Since B(m*) is the fraction of the Home aggregate income spent on the Home industries and
αj(w) is the share of factor j in the domestic division of the Home industries, the first term of the
RHS of eq. (2) is the income earned by Home factor j derived from the domestic market. The
second term is the income earned by Home factor j derived from the export market, because
B*(m) is the fraction of the Foreign aggregate income spent on the Home industries, and βj(w;τ)
is the share of factor j in the export division of the Home industries.
Similarly, the equilibrium condition for the market for Foreign factor j is given by
(4) wj*Vj* = αj*(w*)[1−B*(m)]w*V* + βj*(w*;τ*)[1−B(m*)]wV,   (j = 1, 2,…J),
where αj*(w*) ≡ wj*Φj*(w*)/Φ*(w*) is the share of factor j in the domestic division of the
Foreign industries; βj*(w*;τ*) ≡ wj*Ψj*(w*;τ*)/Ψ*(w*;τ*) is the share of factor j in the export7
division of the Foreign industries; 1−B(m*) is the fraction of the Home aggregate income spent
on the Foreign industries; and 1−B*(m) is the fraction of the Foreign aggregate income spent on
the Foreign industries.
Recall that the linear homogeneity of Φ(w) and Ψ(w) implies 
J
j 1 αj(w) =
 
J
j 1 βj(w;τ) = 1.  Hence, adding up (3) for all j yields
(5) [1−B(m*)]wV = B*(m)w*V*.
This may be viewed as the balanced trade condition, as the LHS is the total value of the Foreign
export and the RHS is the total value of the Home export.  Likewise, adding up (4) for all j also
yields eq. (5).  This means that each of eq. (3) and eq. (4) offers J −1 equilibrium conditions in
addition to eq. (5).  Thus, eqs. (1)-(5) altogether contain 2J+1 equilibrium conditions.  They
jointly determine 2J+1 unknowns, the two marginal industries, m and m*, and the 2J −1 relative
factor prices (i.e., the 2J absolute factor prices, w and w*, up to a scale.)  We can use eqs. (1)-(5)
to examine the effects of globalization caused by technological change in the export divisions, by
shifting the two parameters, τ and τ*.
3. Globalization as Unbiased Technical Change: Restoring the DFS (1977) model.
Let us first consider the following special case of (A2).
(A3) Ψ(w;τ) = τΦ(w) with τ > 1; Ψ*(w*;τ*) = τ*Φ*(w*)  with τ* > 1.
Thus, the cost function of the export division can be obtained by a homogeneous shift of the cost
function of the domestic division.  This assumption thus implies that both divisions have the
same factor intensity; βj(w;τ) = αj(w) and βj*(w*;τ*)= αj*(w*).  The two divisions differ only in
the total factor productivity.  Furthermore, a shift in the shift parameters, τ and τ*, the technical
change in the export divisions, satisfies the Hicks-neutrality.
With (A3) and using eq. (5), eqs. (1)-(4) become8
(6) A(m) = τΦ(w)/Φ*(w*),
(7) A(m*) = Φ(w)/τ*Φ*(w*),
(8) wjVj = αj(w)wV, (j = 1, 2,…J)
(9) wj*Vj* = αj*(w*)w*V*,    (j = 1, 2,…J)
To simplify the above equations further, let us define F(x) ≡ minq {qx | Φ(q) ≥ 1}.  It is
linear homogeneous, increasing and concave in x, and satisfies Φ(w) ≡ minx {wx | F(x) ≥ 1}.
Thus, it can be interpreted as the primary functions underlying Φ(w), where the technologies of





E(z) are the vector of factors used in the domestic and export
divisions of industry z.  Since all the J factors are used in the same proportion in all the activities
in equilibrium, they must be used in the same proportion with the factor endowment in
equilibrium.  Hence, since Fj is homogeneous of degree zero, wj = p(z)Fj(V)/a(z) =
p*(z)Fj(V)/τa(z) = Φ(w)Fj(V) for all j.  Therefore, from the linear homogeneity of F,
(10) wV = Φ(w)F(V) = WL,
where W and L are defined by W ≡ Φ(w) and L ≡ F(V).  In other words, we can aggregate all the
factors into the single quantity index, “labor”, L = F(V), with the single price index, “the wage
rate,” W = Φ(w).
4  Likewise, by defining F*(x) ≡ minq {qx | Φ*(q) ≥ 1},
(11) w*V* = Φ*(w*)F*(V*) = W*L*,
where the quantity index, L* = F*(V*), is the Foreign “labor” endowment and the price index,
W* = Φ*(w*), is the Foreign “wage rate.”  Using (10)-(11), eqs. (5)-(7) become
(12) A(m)/τ = W/W* = B*(m)L*/[1−B(m*)]L,
(13) A(m*)τ* = W/W* = B*(m)L*/[1−B(m*)]L,
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while (8) and (9) become
(14) Vj = Φj(w)L, (j = 1, 2,…J),
(15) Vj* = Φj*(w*)L*,    (j = 1, 2,…J).
Note that eqs. (12)-(13) jointly determine m and m* as a function of τ and τ*, as shown in
Figure 2.  A decline in τ shifts the steeper curve, representing (12), to the right, and as a result,
leads to a higher m, a lower m*, and a higher W/W*.  Note that an improvement in the Home
export technologies not only expands the Home export divisions but also the Foreign export
divisions.  Intuitively, as the improved export technologies enables the Home export divisions to
replace the Foreign domestic divisions in (m, m'), the Home wage rate goes up relative to the
Foreign wage rate, which leads to a replacement of the Home domestic divisions by the Foreign
export divisions in (m*',m*).  This causes a reallocation of the Home labor from the domestic
divisions in (m*', m*) to the export divisions in (m, m').  At the same time, the Foreign labor is
reallocated from the domestic divisions in (m, m') to the export divisions in (m*', m*).  Likewise,
a decline in τ* leads to a lower m*, a higher m, and a lower W/W*.  Thus, an improvement in the
export technologies, regardless of whether it takes place at Home or at Foreign, leads to a growth
of trade and a reallocation of labor from the domestic to export divisions in both countries.
Under (A3), however, this reallocation of labor from the domestic to the export divisions
does not have any effect on the relative factor prices within each country.  Note that, eqs. (14)-
(15) are independent of τ and τ*, as well as of m, m*, and W/W*.  The relative factor prices
within each country are determined solely by eqs. (14)-(15).  Recall that technical change in the
export divisions is Hicks-neutral, hence their relative factor demands are unaffected.
Furthermore, the export divisions use all the factors in the same proportion with the domestic
divisions.  Hence, the relative factor demands cannot change through the composition effect,10
either.  When globalization does not change the relative factor demands, it has no effect on the
relative factor prices.
5
It is worth pointing out that the above model, under (A3), is essentially the same with the
DFS model.  For example, if we set τ = τ* = 1, then m = m* and eqs. (12)-(13) collapse into
A(m) = W/W* = B*(m)L*/[1−B(m)]L.  This is isomorphic to the equilibrium condition of the
basic model of DFS (1977, Section I), which assumed B(z) = B*(z).  This should come as no
surprise.  The two critical departures of the present model from DFS (i.e., the multiplicity of the
factors and the distinction between the domestic and export divisions) are inconsequential in this
case, because (A3) means that all the activities have the same factor intensity, which allow us to
aggregate all the factors into the single composite, “labor,” as in the basic DFS model, and
because, with τ = τ* = 1, both the domestic and export divisions produce the identical goods with
the identical technologies, again as in the basic DFS model.  DFS (1977, Section IIIB) also
extended their model to allow for transport costs.  Following the iceberg model of Samuelson
(1954), they assumed that a fraction g of good z shipped to the export market actually arrives.
Therefore, in order to supply one unit of good z to the Foreign country, Home must produce and
ship 1/g units of good z, which make the price of the Home good z in the Foreign market equal to
a(z)W/g.  Eqs. (12)-(13) are identical to the equilibrium conditions for the DFS model with the
iceberg transport cost if we set τ = τ* = 1/g > 1.   This suggests an alternative interpretation of the
iceberg transport cost commonly used in the literature.  Instead of thinking that each industry
produces with the same technology both for the domestic and export markets, but only a fraction
of the goods shipped arrives to the export market, one can think that the domestic and export
divisions produce different goods, each tailored made for each market, and that the total factor
productivity of the export division is a fraction of that of the domestic division.  As long as the
two divisions use all the factors in the same proportion, these two specifications give the
identical results.  In short, we can view as a decline in the iceberg transport cost as a special form
of technical changes that benefit the export divisions.
According to this alternative interpretation, however, a reduction in τ and τ* can occur
not only through an improvement in transport technologies, but also through any changes that
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help to lower the cost of serving the export markets.  Such changes may include an improvement
in communication and information technologies (telegraphs, telephones, facsimiles, internet,
communication satellite, etc), a harmonization of the regulations across countries, a wider
acceptance of English as the common business language, as well as an emergence of the global
consumer culture that reduces the need to make the goods tailor-made for each country.  Perhaps
more importantly, this alternative interpretation also suggests a natural way of going beyond the
iceberg specification. Once we can start thinking about the possibility that the destination of the
good affect the technologies of supplying the good, we may start thinking about the possibility
that it affects not only the total factor productivity but also the factor intensity. As will be seen
below, this opens up the possibility that a change in the export technologies, and the resulting
growth of trade and reallocation of the factors from the domestic to export divisions, lead to a
change in the relative factor prices in the same direction both at Home and Foreign.
Before proceeding, it is worth pointing out that one could reinterpret eqs. (12)-(15) as the
equilibrium conditions for the case where the domestic and export divisions share the same
technology, but the Foreign government imposes the tariff on the Home goods at the rate equal to
τ − 1, and the Home government imposes the tariff on the Foreign goods at the rate equal to τ* −
1, under the assumption that the tariff revenues are entirely wasted so that they do not affect the
aggregate expenditure of the two countries.  Then, the above result suggests that a reduction in
the tariff leads to a globalization (an increase in m and a decline in m*), but it does not affect the
relative factor prices under (A3).
4. Globalization as Biased Technical Changes
We are now going to show how technical changes in the export technologies can affect
the relative prices, if we drop the restrictive assumption, (A3).  Recall the equilibrium conditions
are given by eqs. (1)-(5).   Since the key mechanism does not rely on the asymmetry between
Home and Foreign, let us focus on the case, where the two countries are the mirror images of
each other.  That is,
(M) A(m)A(1−m) = 1; B(m) = B*(m) with B(m) + B(1−m) = 1;
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
intensity differ across the goods.12
Φ = Φ*, Ψ = Ψ* (so that αj = αj*, βj = βj*), and V = V*, and τ = τ*.
Then, in symmetric equilibrium, w = w*, m = 1−m* < ½, and the equilibrium conditions are now
reduced to
(16) A(m) = Ψ(w;τ)/Φ(w),
(17) Vj = {αj(w) + [βj(w;τ)−αj(w)]B(m)}wV/wj (j = 1, 2,…J).
Eq. (16) shows that, given the factor prices, an improvement in the export technologies (a change
in τ that causes a downward shift of Ψ) leads to an increase in m (and a decline in m* = 1−m).
The RHS of Eq. (17) is the demand for factor j.  It shows that a shift in τ could affect the factor
demand for two separate routes.  First, it could affect through international trade.  A higher m
increases the demand for the factors used more intensively in the export divisions (those with βj
> αj) and reduces demand for those used more intensively in the domestic divisions (those with βj
< αj).  Thus, globalization can affect the factor demand by changing the composition between the
domestic and export divisions.  Second, it could affect by changing the relative factor demand
within the export divisions, if βj(w;τ) depends on τ.  Note that there is an important special case,
where a shift in τ could affect the factor demand only through the first route.  This is the case
where the technical change in the export divisions satisfies the Hicks-neutrality:
(A4) Ψ(w;τ) = τΨ(w) with τ > 1 and Ψ(w) > Φ(w).
In this case, βj(w;τ) is independent of τ, which allow us to simply drop τ to denote it as βj(w).
Under (A4), the RHS of eq. (17) no longer depends on τ.  Thus, a shift in τ affects the factor
demands only by changing the composition of the domestic and export divisions.
6
To analyze eqs. (16)-(17) further, let us consider the two-factor case (J = 2).  Then, eqs.
(16)-(17) become
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(18) A(m)  =  ψ(ω;τ)/φ(ω)
(19) 
      
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where ω ≡ w1/w2 (= ω* ≡ w1*/w2*) is the relative factor price; φ(ω) ≡ Φ(ω,1) = Φ(w1,w2)/w2,
ψ(ω;τ) ≡ Ψ(ω,1; τ) = Ψ(w1,w2; τ)/w2; α1(ω) = 1− α2(ω) and β1(ω; τ) = 1−β2(ω;τ) are the shares of
factor 1 in the domestic and export divisions.  (Recall that Φ and Ψ are linear homogeneous and
that the factor shares, αj and βj, satisfy the homogeneity of degree zero).  Note that the RHS of
eq. (19) is the relative demand curve for factor 1 over factor 2.
Figure 3 depicts eqs. (18)-(19) over the (m, ω)-space, under the assumption that the
export division is more factor 1 intensive than the domestic division; α1(ω) < β1(ω;τ).  This factor
intensity assumption implies that eq. (18) is downward-sloping.
7  Intuitively, a lower ω makes
the cost of the export divisions decline more than the cost of the domestic divisions, therefore
trade take places in a larger fraction of the industries (i.e., a higher m and a lower m* = 1−m).
Under the same factor intensity assumption, an expansion of the export divisions at the expense
of the domestic division (a higher m and a lower m* = 1−m) leads to an increase in the relative
demand for factor 1.  This in turn leads to a higher ω in a stable factor market equilibrium. Thus,
eq. (19) is upward-sloping, whenever the factor market is stable.
8  Figure 3 is drawn under the
assumption that the factor market equilibrium is always stable, so that the curve depicting eq.
(19) is everywhere upward-sloping.
9  The equilibrium is given by point E, at the intersection of
the two curves.
                                                                       
7Algebraically, log-differentiating eq. (18) yields dω/dm = ωA'(m)/A(m)[β1(ω;τ)−α1(ω)] < 0.
8To see this algebraically, let the RHS of eq. (19), the relative factor demand, denoted by f(ω, m; τ).  Then, β1(ω; τ) >
α1(ω) implies fm > 0. The Walrasian stability of the factor market equilibrium requires that relative demand curve is
decreasing in the relative price: i.e., fω < 0. Thus, dω/dm = − fm/fω > 0 along the stable factor market equilibrium
satisfying eq. (19).
9This is the case, for example, if Φ and Ψ are Cobb-Douglas so that α1 and β1 are constant.  Of course, without
making some restrictions on the functional forms of Φ and Ψ, one cannot rule out the possibility that the relative
factor demand, f(ω, m; τ), may be increasing in ω over some ranges, and eq. (19) may permit multiple factor price
equilibriums.  If so, the curve depicting eq. (19) over the (m, ω)-space could have an S-shape.  In such a case, the
downward-sloping part corresponds to an unstable equilibrium, and hence only the upward-sloping parts are relevant
for the comparative statics.  For this reason, we will not discuss such “pathological” cases of downward-sloping eq.
(19) in what follows.  This is nothing but the famous “Correspondence Principle” of Samuelson (1947).14
A reduction in τ shifts eq. (18), the downward-sloping curve, to the right.  Under (A4),
i.e., when the improvement in the export technologies satisfies the Hicks-neutrality, eq. (19) is
independent of τ, so that the upward-sloping curve remains intact.  Hence, the equilibrium moves
from point E to point E'.  The result is an increase in both m and ω.  An improvement in the
export technologies not only leads to a globalization, which can be measured either in the share
of the traded industries, m+1−m* = 2m, or in the Trade/Income ratio, B*(m)+B(1−m*) = 2B(m).
It also leads to an increase in the relative price of the factor used intensively in the export
divisions.
The analysis would become a little bit more complex when (A4) does not hold, i.e., when
the improvement in the export technologies violates the Hicks-neutrality.  However, unless the
nonneutrality is too strong, the result would go through.  If the technical improvement favors
factor 1 over factor 2 within the export divisions, then the upward-sloping curve shifts upward,
when the downward-sloping curve moves to the right.  The relative factor price, ω,
unambiguously goes up.  It also leads to an increase in m, unless the nonneutrality is too strong
and the upward-sloping curve shifts too much.  If the improvement favors factor 2 over factor 1,
then the upward-sloping curve shifts downward, while the downward-sloping curve moves to the
right.  It leads unambiguously to an increase in m. The relative factor price also goes up, unless
the nonneutrality is too strong and the upward-sloping curve shifts too much.
It is worth reminding the reader that the case of the Hicks-neutral technical change in the
export division, (A4), depicted in Figure 3, can be reinterpreted as a reduction in the tariff.
According to this interpretation, (A4) means that the cost functions of the export division is
given by a(z)Ψ(w) at Home and a*(z)Ψ(w) at Foreign, but the tariffs at the rate equal to τ−1 are
levied to all the imports.  Then, one can interpret that Figure 3 captures the effect of a reduction
in the tariff.
10  Thus, globalization, whether it is caused by a Hicks-neutral improvement in the
export technologies or a reduction in the tariff, leads to a rise in the prices of the factors used
intensively in the export divisions relative to those used intensively in the domestic divisions
both at Home and at Foreign.
                                                                       
10 In the symmetric case, the additional effect of the tariff revenue does not affect the equilibrium, as long as each
government transfers its revenue to its own residents.15
5. An Application: Globalization and Skill Premia
The model presented above can be useful for thinking about the debate on the role of
globalization in the recent rise in the skill premia.  Imagine that there are two types of labor;
skilled and unskilled.  Suppose that the export division is more skilled labor intensive than the
domestic division.  Furthermore, suppose that technical changes that take place primarily in the
export divisions or a reduction in the tariffs lead to globalization.  This would lead to a rise in the
skill premia in all the countries.
However, we do not need to assume that the technical changes take place primarily in the
export divisions to obtain the above result.  Skilled-labor augmenting technical changes can also
have the same effect, as long as we maintain the assumption that the export division is more
skilled-labor intensive.
To see this, let us now modify the above model as follows.  There are two factors, now
labeled as s for skilled labor and u for unskilled labor.  The cost functions of the domestic and
export divisions of industry z are given by a(z)Φ(τws,wu) and a(z)Ψ(τws,wu) at Home and
a*(z)Φ*(τ*ws*, wu*) and a*(z)Ψ*(τ*ws, wu) at Foreign.  Note that the shift parameters, τ and τ*,
enter in the cost functions of both the domestic and export divisions.  A reduction in τ (and τ*)
now means a skill-labor augmenting technical change, and hence it reduces the costs of both the
domestic and export divisions for fixed wage rates.  We also need to replace (A2) by
(A5) Φ(τws, wu) < Ψ(τws, wu) and Φ*(τ*ws*, wu*) < Ψ*(τ*ws*, wu*).
Then, by following the same steps as done in Section 2, we can conduct the analysis of this
modified model and derive its equilibrium conditions, analogous to eqs.(1)-(5).
Instead of repeating the whole analysis, let us focus on the case where the two countries
are the mirror-images of each other.  Then, the equations analogous to eqs. (18)-(19) are given by
(20) A(m)  =  ψ(τω)/φ(τω),
(21) ) (
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where ω ≡ ws/wu (= ω* ≡ ws*/wu*) is the price of skilled labor measured in unskilled labor.  The
intuition behind eqs. (20)-(21) should be clear.  Because a reduction in τ is now skilled-labor
augmenting, τ enters in these equations only through the “effective” price of skilled labor
measured in the units of unskilled labor, τω, and through the “effective” supply of skilled labor,
Vs/τ.
As before, we further focus on the special case, where the technical changes satisfy the
Hicks-neutrality.   A skilled labor augmenting technical change can be Hicks-neutral if and only
if the functional forms for Φ and Ψ are Cobb-Douglas.
11  That is to say, we assume that
(A6) Φ(τws,wu) = (τws)
α(wu)
1−α,  Ψ(τws,wu) = Г(τws)
β(wu)
1−β,    0 < α < β < 1.
where the parameter, Г, is sufficiently large to ensure that Φ(τws,wu) < Ψ(τws,wu) in equilibrium.
Then, eqs. (20)-(21) become
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respectively. These equations can be analyzed by means of Figure 3.  The assumption that the
export division is more skilled-labor intensive, α < β, implies not only that eq. (22) is downward-
sloping and eq. (23) upward-sloping in the (m-ω) space.  It also implies that a skilled-labor
augmenting technical change (a reduction in τ) shifts the downward-sloping curve to the right,
because it reduces the cost of the export division more than the cost of the domestic division.
Hence, it leads to globalization and an increase in skill premia.  Needless to say, if we drop the
assumption of Hicks-neutrality, the analysis would be more complex, because eq. (21) generally
                                                                       
11We skip the proof, because this is formally equivalent to the following well-known result in the neoclassical growth
literature, first shown by Uzawa (1961); technical changes are both Hicks-neutral (TFP-augmenting) and Harrod-
neutral (labor-augmenting) if and only if the aggregate production function is Cobb-Douglas.17
depends on τ.  However, unless the nonneutrality is too strong, the effect would be qualitatively
similar.
In summary, we have shown that, when the export division is more skilled-labor intensive
than the domestic division, a globalization leads to a rise in the skill premia in all the countries, if
the globalization is driven by a reduction in the tariff, or by (Hicks-neutral) technical changes
that are skill-labor augmenting and/or take place primarily in the export divisions.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to survey the vast literature on the role of
globalization in the recent rise of the skill premia.  Much of the literature draws a sharp
distinction between two possible causes; skill-biased technical change and international trade.
Most economists seem to discount the role of trade in favor of skill-biased technical changes for
a couple of reasons. First, according to the factor proportion theory of trade, an increase in trade
can explain the recent rise in the skill premium in the skill-labor abundant United States, but not
the similar rise in the skill premia among the skill-labor scarce trading partners. Second, the
factor proportion theory of trade also suggests that the rise in the skill premium in the US must
be accompanied by the rise in the relative price of the skill-labor intensive goods, which has not
been observed empirically.  Our explanation is not subject to these criticisms because what is
skill labor intensive in our model is trade itself, not the types of the goods traded.  Therefore,
globalization leads to reallocation of labor towards more skill-intensive activities in all the
countries.
Perhaps more importantly, the above analysis questions the validity of the dichotomy
between skilled biased technical change and international trade. In this respect, it is worth
mentioning Acemoglu (2003) and Thoenig and Verdier (2003), which developed sophisticated
models of endogenous technical changes to show how international trade stimulates skill-biased
technical changes.  Their studies suggest that “globalization vs. skilled biased technical changes”
is a false dichotomy, because globalization induces skilled-biased technical change.  This study
suggests that it is a false dichotomy, because globalization is a form of skilled biased technical
change.
12
                                                                       
12The Acemoglu model (and the Thoenig and Verdier model to significant extent) relies on the asymmetry of the
countries, and hence has the implication that North-South trade should be skill-biased.  On the other hand, our model
does not rely on the asymmetry, and hence suggests that all trade should be skill-biased.  This might make our18
6. Concluding Remarks
  In this paper, we have proposed a new approach to model costly international trade,
which includes the standard approach, the “iceberg” transport cost, as a special case.  The key
idea is to make the technologies of supplying the good depend on the destination of the good.  To
demonstrate our approach, we have extended the Ricardian model with a continuum of goods, by
introducing multiple factors of production and making each industry consist of the domestic
division, which supplies the good at home, and the export division, which supplies the good
abroad.  If the two divisions differ only in the total factor productivity, our model becomes
isomorphic to the DFS model with the iceberg transport cost.  When the two divisions differ also
in the factor intensity, globalization changes the relative factor prices in the same direction across
countries, in sharp contrast to the usual Stolper-Samuelson effect, which suggests that the
relative factor prices move in different directions in different countries.  The analysis in this
paper offers a fresh perspective on the debate on the role of globalization in the recent rise in the
skill premia.
The iceberg transport cost has been used widely in many different classes of international
trade models.  Although we have highlighted the difference between our approach and the
iceberg approach using the DFS model as a background, our approach should be useful as a more
flexible alternative to the iceberg approach in other models, as well.  Indeed, applications of our
approach need not to be restricted to those models that previously used the iceberg transport cost.
It can be useful for any situation where the international activities are inherently more costly than
the domestic activities.
13
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
argument more appealing to many economists who think that North-South trade is too small to have had much of an
effect. (We thank Daron Acemoglu for making this observation.)
13For example, consider the recent literature on the patterns of global sourcing, such as Grossman and Helpman
(forthcoming) and Antras and Helpman (2004). In these models, setting up the organization abroad is more costly
than setting it up domestically, but the location does not change the type of the resources required.  However, it
would be more plausible to assume that FDI or international sourcing would require different types of skill than
building plants at home or domestic sourcing.  (Just think of all those highly compensated international business
consultants sent abroad to supervise the oversea operations.)  Our approach should provide a useful tool for
modeling such situations.19
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Figure 3: Biased Globalization